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CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT:
The Question is "Why not?"
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act' in order to "promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employ-
ment."12 Although the ADEA incorporates selected enforcement pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 3 and comes within the pur-
view of the Labor Department, it bears near identity in purpose, and
at times in phrasing, to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.4 The nature
of the ADEA's relationship to the Civil Rights Act and the FLSA
becomes important in the area of class actions because of the dichot-
omy in availability of class actions under the Civil Rights Act and
the FLSA. Rule 231 class actions are liberally allowed under the
Civil Rights Act,6 while not permitted at all by § 16(b) of the FLSA.7
It is the purpose of this comment to determine the proper construc-
tion of the ADEA vis-A-vis class actions.
1H. CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE ADEA
Class actions face two hurdles within the ADEA. First, the Act
provides that it be enforced in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(section 16(b) of the FLSA), which in turn provides that "[n]o
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives
his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is
filed in the court in which such action is brought."' Second, the
'29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as the ADEA].
229 U.S.C. § 621(b) (Supp. 1974).
129 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as the FLSA]. The sections incorpo-
rated are 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216(b)(c)(d), 217 (1965).
142 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1971).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1973).
'See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 1968).
7Clougherty v. James Vernor Co., 187 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 814
(1951); Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).
829 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1971).
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ADEA prohibits commencement of an action by an individual un-
less the individual has given the Secretary of Labor sixty days'
notice of intent to file such action, and the notice to the Secretary
is filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.'
Neither provision prohibits a class action given judicial interpreta-
tion of the ADEA similar to that of Title VII; on the other hand, a
literal application of the former will legally defeat Rule 23 class
actions,10 while a literal application of the latter will realistically
defeat Rule 23 class actions."
Inquiry into the advantages and disadvantages of a Rule 23 class
action as compared to the procedure provided in the FLSA reveals
that while the Rule 23 class action is not a panacea, it is nonetheless
substantially more efficacious in terms of enforcement of the ADEA.
Rule 23 allows a plaintiff with a small claim'2 to obtain counsel.'3
129 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. 1974):
(d) No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section
until the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an
intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlaw-
ful practice occurred, or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within
three hundred days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or
within thirty days after receipt by the individual of notice of termina-
tion of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue, the Secretary shall promptly notify all
persons named therein as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly
seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation,
conference, and persuasion.
'"Rule 23 expressly provides that members of the class will be bound without any appear-
ance in or communication with the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). To provide that no member
of the class will be bound unless he files a written consent in the court in which the action is
brought apparently denies Rule 23 class actions. Some courts refer to this situation as one in
which Rule 23 is applicable, with additional conditions. Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 5 E.P.D,
7995 (D.D.C. 1972). The writer believes it is more accurate to say Rule 23 is simply not
applicable, since the statute by providing its own rule abrogates Rule 23. This was the
position taken in Hull v. Continental Oil Co., 58 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
"A requirement that each member of the class have filed a notice of intent to file the
action with the Secretary of Labor does not necessarily defeat class actions in that the action
could still be prosecuted by a representative of the class, if the class met the other require-
ments of Rule 23 (Rule 23(a)(1), requiring that the class be so numerous that joinder is
impractical, would normally be problematic in these circumstances). But such a provision
realistically abrogates Rule 23's application in that it destroys any motive for proceeding as
a class action; it operates as a stringent jurisdictional condition precedent that so decimates
the potential class as to make proceeding as a class action meaningless.
12Many claims arising under the ADEA are relatively small. In a speech discussing
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Arguably, section 16(b) does as well. 4 However, unlike Rule 23,1
section 16(b) carries no notice provision, so that an attorney does
not have available an effective means of finding potential plaintiffs.
Thus the class will very likely be limited to those who hear of a
pending action by word of mouth. This may well lead attorneys to
decline to prosecute claims for individual plaintiffs.
The notice provisions of Rule 23 may be as valuable to the rest of
the class as they are to the individual plaintiff. In Rule 23 class
actions, each member of a class is bound, unless it is a b(3) class
action and he has opted out."6 In contrast, under the 16(b) proce-
dure, where no notice is required, only the named plaintiffs are
bound by a judgment-with the caveat that the stare decisis effect
of the decision may in some circumstances be as damaging to future
plaintiffs as res judicata or collateral estoppel. 7 So under section
enforcement in the first six months after the Act, Mr. Robert Moran gave as examples a
number of actions for $400-$500. Speech by Robert Moran, Wage-Hour Administrator, before
National Council of Senior Citizens in Washington, D.C., June 5, 1969.
"The Supreme Court has recently recognized the necessity of class actions if small claims
are to be successfully prosecuted:
A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner's individual stake in the damage
award he seeks is only $70. No competent attorney would undertake his complex
antitrust action to recover so inconsequential a sum. Economic reality dictates that
petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2144 (1974). See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 484-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 1970); Comment, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation-Catch
22 in Rule 23, 10 Hous. L. REV. 337, 343 (1973); Note, Parties Plaintiff in Civil Rights
Litigation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 903 (1968).
"See Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 7 E.P.D. 9120 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
"SRule 23 has two notice provisions: the requirement in Rule 23(c)(2) for notice to class
members in (b)(3) class actions, and the provision in Rule 23(d)(2) that the court may require
notice to some or all members of the class in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. FED. R. Civ. P.
23.
'lThe Supreme Court has recently ruled that in (b)(3) class actions "individual notice
[must] be sent to all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort." (Empha-
sis supplied.) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974). This represents an
additional safeguard for class members in (b)(3) class actions. However Eisen, in combination
with Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring that each member of
the class have the jurisdictional amount), may indicate a trend toward restraints on class
actions. If that is the case it is unfortunate:
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against
those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with the view of
creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those
liberally endowed with power and wealth.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2156-57 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"
7Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46
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16(b) the members of the "class" are most unlikely to receive any
notice of the suit-but likely to be affected by its outcome.
Additionally, Rule 23 is beneficial to the plaintiff in that a Rule
23 class action tolls the statute for the class. Also, under the ADEA,
an injured party has only 180 days to give notice of the violation to
the Secretary of Labor. 8 Therefore if a class action plaintiff "discov-
ers" all complaints about the defendant, no one who has preserved
his own cause of action will be without notice and an opportunity
to opt out. And those who have not complained themselves may
have their causes of action preserved by the class suit."
Precisely because the Rule 23 class action is more beneficial to
plaintiffs under the ADEA, it is more appropriate. The ADEA is a
remedial act, intended to benefit directly an aggrieved group; effec-
tive remedies are, of course, essential to the realization of the Act's
purpose. Further, like victims of racial discrimination, victims of
age discrimination are by definition a class.2" To the degree that the
Rule 23 class action is more beneficial to the class protected by the
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Weinstein, Revision of Procedure; Some Problems in
Class Actions, 9 Bun'. L. REV. 433, 446-48 (1960). Perhaps the most serious probable effect
on future plaintiffs is that, from a practical point of view, the fact that a previous plaintiff
has lost an action against a particular defendant will deter most prospective plaintiffs.
129 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1974).
"See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); Local 186, Inter-
national Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 (N.D.
Ind. 1969). The development of awards of back pay in Title VII class actioAs where each
discriminatee has not filed a complaint is treated in Comment, Back Pay in Class Actions
and Pattern or Practice Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 EMORY L.J.
163 (1974).
nThe Fifth Circuit has noted that "[r]acial discrimination is by definition class discrim-
ination. . . ." Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). That is
true as well of age discrimination. The suitability of class actions for suits under the ADEA
is exemplified in the facts of Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1972). In that case undisputed facts showed that for over a year, no one within the Act's
protection was hired by defendant as a teller. Of the 35 persons who were hired as tellers, all
were under 40; all but three were under 30. Another fact was that the job order on file with
an employment agency called for teller trainees between the ages of 21 and 24. Also, defen-
dant's representative wrote "too old for teller" on his interview notes with the 47 year old
plaintiff. Finally, defendant admitted familiarity with the provisions of the ADEA. 455 F.2d
at 821-23. A commentator has noted that the opinion implies that in age discrimination cases,
as in Title VII cases, statistical proof of non-employment of persons 40 through 65 may
constitute a prima facie case of violation of the ADEA. Note, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 601, 606
(1972). See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), where
statistics established a violation of Title VII.
COMMENTS
Act, its availability in appropriate cases is more clearly mandated."1
It should be noted that even though a Rule 23 class action is avail-
able, the court has a great degree of discretion in determining when
it is appropriate, 2 and thus in controlling any potential abuse.
A. § 16(b) of the FLSA as Incorporated by § 626(b) of the ADEA
In construing § 16(b) of the FLSA as the enforcement provision
of the ADEA,2 one necessarily observes that literal application is
absolutely untenable. Because 16(b) was written as the enforcement
provision for suits to recover minimum wage and overtime compen-
sation, it provides exclusively for suits by employees. Yet the first
sentence of the ADEA states its special concern with the plight of
older workers attempting "to regain employment when displaced r
from jobs. .... -2" The ADEA clearly prohibits failure to hire an
individual between the ages of 40 and 65 because of age, and gives
a cause of action to aggrieved persons who never attain the status
of an employee.2 Therefore when § 16(b) of the FLSA is incorpo-
rated into the ADEA, the word "employee" must be read as "indi-
vidual."
The core difficulty with section 16(b) vis-A-vis class actions is its
requirement that consent in writing be filed with the court before
any individual may be recognized as a party. This consent require-
21The argument that Rule 23 class actions should be available under the ADEA to insure
adequate enforcement of its provisions is buttressed by the fact that discrimination against
the aged in employment is "still prevalent and, in fact, is increasing. There were more than
2500 violations found under the Act in the 1971 fiscal year, and it is estimated that this figure
represents only a portion of the actual number of violations. . . ." Comment, Discrimination
against the Elderly: A Prospectus of the Problem, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 917, 922 (1973). Yet
as of 1971, only 80 suits had been filed. Id.
nFrankel at 39; Note, Parties Plaintiff in Civil Rights Litigation, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 893,
903-04 (1968).
-29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1971) (§ 16(b) of the FLSA) reads:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title
shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liabil-
ity may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives
his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court
in which such action is brought. . ..
2129 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
229 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(2), 626(c), 631 (Supp. 1974).
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ment is a 1947 amendment to section 16(b), and in conjunction with
the Portal-to-Portal Act" it represents congressional response to the
extraordinary amount of litigation arising after the Supreme Court
decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.2" In Anderson, an
action brought under the FLSA, the Court held that workers were
due compensation for time spent walking to work on the employer's
premises and for time spent in additional activities preliminary to
actual work." As a result of that decision on June 10, 1946, between
July 1, 1946, and Jan. 31, 1947, 1913 suits under the FLSA were filed
in federal district courts, 1515 of which asked a total of
$5,785,204,606. The remaining 398 left the amount of damages to
the determination of the court. And 62% of the suits were filed in
January. In addition to being concerned about the staggering effect
of this litigation on many industries, Congress was especially
alarmed by an estimate that the federal government's potential
liability under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts was as high as
$1,400,000,000.29 In response to this specter, Congress enacted the
Portal-to-Portal Act." Significantly, the ADEA did not incorporate
section 56 of the FLSA, 31 one of the most stringent provisions of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, and clearly a companion to section 16(b). Sec-
tion 56 provides that the statute of limitations is not tolled for
individual claimants until their consent is filed.32 Had Congress
intended to impose on ADEA claimants the stringent limitations
imposed on FLSA claimants by the Portal-to-Portal Act, it presum-
ably would have incorporated section 56 in the ADEA. The fact that
Congress did not, coupled with the fact that the consent require-
ment in section 16(b) was enacted specifically to curtail available
remedies under the FLSA,33 supports an argument that it was not
229 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 251-62 (1971).
z328 U. .680, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 822 (1946).
137d. at 91-93.
"H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
311d. at 1.
3129 U.S.C. § 256 (1971).
321d.
*4H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1947). The minority report criticized the
bill, stating:
this bill makes very basic changes for the future as well as the past in the
general enforcement and operation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Bad cases
make bad laws. . . . In order to proscribe the bad cases, a sweeping remedy is
proposed that not only for practical purposes bars portal-to-portal suits,.., but
also emasculates the . . . Fair Labor Standards Act.
Id. at 9.
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meant to have that same effect in the ADEA. Certainly there is no
hint in the legislative history of the ADEA of any intention to limit
available remedies.3 4
Nevertheless, one line of construction open to the courts is that
the ADEA, like the FLSA, allows no Rule 23 class action. This is
easily justified by reading party plaintiff in section 16(b) to mean
every member of the class and not just the representatives," and by
adopting the case law that has developed under the FLSA. This is
the position, somewhat summarily reached, of the trial courts in
four out of the five cases that have reached the issue.36
The other line of construction is to read party plaintiff in section
16(b) to mean the representatives of the class.37 This would allow a
Rule 23 class action by obviating the need for written consents from
every member of the class. One trial court has adopted this con-
struction in a thorough opinion that looks to the purpose of the
ADEA and recognizes its kinship to Title Vl.11
In determining which line of construction is appropriate, a tenet
of statutory construction comes into play. It is axiomatic that broad
remedial acts should be liberally construed.39 Congress and the
"Hearings on S. 830, 788, Before Subcommittee on Labor, Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];
Hearings on H.R. 3651, 3768, and 4221, Before General Subcommittee on Labor, House
Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings]; S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
IThe sentence at issue reads: "No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1965). One possible interpretation
is that party plaintiff refers to each potential member of the class; the other is that it refers
only to the "representative parties" (in the terminology of Rule 23).
"Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 622 (D. Kan. 1973). (Burgett held that Rule
23 was inapplicable and that written consents were required for each member of the class in
the class action created by 216(b); Hull v. Continental Oil Co., 58 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(Hull also expressly held Rule 23 inapplicable, and distinguished Title VII class actions
without discussion); Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, Inc., 5 E.P.D. 7995 (D.D.C. 1972) (Bishop
held Rule 23 was applicable, but that the class was limited to those individuals who filed
consents); Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 5 E.P.D. 7997 (S.D. Miss. 1972) (Price, like Bishop,
allows a class action with the class limited to those who have filed consents).
"See note 34, supra.
"Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 62 F.R.D. 35, 41 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
"See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
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courts agree that the ADEA is such an Act.4" Thus, the court is
authorized to effectuate the congressional intent with a liberal con-
struction of the language of the Act.4' The more liberal construction
of the ADEA would be to treat it, in terms of procedural require-
ments, as Title VII has been treated." This is particularly appropri-
ate since the ADEA is, in a sense, a child of Title VII." In 1964, Title
VII directed the Secretary of Labor to report to Congress on age
discrimination in employment and specifically required the report
to offer suggested legislation. 4 This report, "The Older American
Worker,"" led directly to the enactment of the ADEA.1°
The most obvious counter-argument is that had Congress wanted
the ADEA handled in the same manner as Title VII, Congress could
have passed it as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act. Fortun-
ately, the legislative history sheds light on Congress' reasons for
putting the ADEA in Title 29 instead of Title 42. In the extensive
hearings, two major reasons appear: one was that by 1967 the EEOC
was already swamped with complaints of discrimination due to race
and sex, and Congress feared that that overload would result in
older workers getting short shrift under Title VII;' 7 the other was
that age discrimination was felt to be more a matter of ignorance
than bigotry, and Congress felt that the ADEA should contain a
significant educational component that would lack effectiveness in
"
0Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 914 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see Hodgson
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); House Hearings at 11.
"See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
4 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 915 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
3Several courts have recognized the kinship between Title VII and the ADEA. Goger v.
H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972). The rationale of the relationship between the Acts was used to
require exhaustion of state remedies under the ADEA:
The minor differences between section 633 and its counterpart under the 1964 Act
are insignificant. . . .Moreover, the legislative history of the 1967 Act, though
largely couched in terms identical to that of the statute, nonetheless is devoid of
any intention of Congress to deviate from the basic philosophy of the 1964 Act ....
Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir. 1974).
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1974).
5Wirtz, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, June, 1965.
"Senate Hearings at 26; House Hearings at 5, 6.
17House Hearings at 13.
838
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Title VI. 48 Neither reason supports an argument that Congress in-
tended remedies under the ADEA to be less than or different from
those under Title VII.
Additionally, in placing the ADEA in the Wages and Hours Divi-
sion of the Labor Department rather than the EEOC, Congress
found reassurance in the fact that the Wages and Hours Division
administers the "Equal Pay Act,"" which prohibits sex. discrimina-
tion." However a suit that can be brought under the Equal Pay Act
can also be brought under Title VII, so that individuals discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sex may bring a Rule 23 class action,"
leaving only the aged without this remedy.
The possibility that class actions could be denied to ADEA plain-
tiffs because of the language of the FLSA is especially ironic because
the legislative history shows that the FLSA was chosen in order to
facilitate private enforcement. The administration bill, when of-
fered, 2 provided that the ADEA would incorporate the enforcement
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act,5 3 which, compared
to the FLSA, retards access to the courts. 4 Precisely because Con-
gress was interested in providing adequate personal remedies as well
as putting teeth in the Act (and in avoiding the creation of an
additional agency)," it chose the FLSA enforcement provisions.5
Neither in the Congressional Record,57 the Reports," nor in the
Hearings59 is there any indication that Congress believed that
incorporating § 16(b) of the FLSA would prohibit Rule 23 class
actions under the ADEA. In fact the clearly expressed congressional
4
'ld.
"129 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1971), amending 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1965). Like the ADEA, the Equal
Pay Act incorporates 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
"Senate Hearings at 44.
"E.g., Maguire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Plaintiff was
allowed a Rule 23 class action under the Civil Rights Act, but the court held Rule 23 inapplic-
able to the Equal Pay Act.
"Senate Hearings at 8-10; House Hearings at 3.
"29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1973).
"House Hearings at 12-13.
"Senate Hearings at 27.
"House Hearings at 13.
"1113 CONG. REc. 34738-55, 35053-57, 35133-34 (1967).
'IS. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
"Senate Hearings; House Hearings.
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concern that adequate enforcement be provided,"0 the analogies
drawn by Congress between age discrimination and those forms of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII,1 (albeit the recognition of
differences as well), and the omission by Congress of § 56 of the
FLSA,62 all lead to the conclusion that there was no congressional
intent to deprive victims of age discrimination of the right to pursue
a class action under Rule 23.
B. Section 626(d) of the ADEA
Given an interpretation of section 16(b)6" as incorporated by the
ADEA64 that permits Rule 23 class actions, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) 0
remains a potential barrier. The ADEA there provides:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under
this section until the individual has given the Secretary not
less than sixty days' notice of an intent to file such action.
Such notice shall be filed-(1) within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred .... 11
A strict interpretation of this provision would mean that each mem-
ber of the class would have had to file a timely notice with the
Secretary of Labor and would, for all practical purposes, defeat a
Rule 23 class action. The five cases which reached this question
have disagreed, two holding that each plaintiff must file with the
Secretary of Labor, 7 the other three that only one plaintiff need file
with the Secretary of Labor.
The latter cases rely on Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,6" a lead-
ing Title VII case. In Bowe and other Title VII cases, the courts have
14Senate Hearings at 44-47; House Hearings at 12-13.
"Senate Hearings at 29, 35.
2See note 33, supra, and accompanying text.
-29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1965).
6129 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Supp. 1974).
-29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. 1974).
a~ld.
'
t Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973); Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 5
E.P.D. 1 7997 (S.D. Miss. 1972). Neither court elaborates on its decision; Gebhard cites Price
for the proposition that filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Price seems simply to have
applied the statute literally.
"Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 62 F.R.D. 35, 42 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Burgett v. Cu-
dahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, Inc., 5 E.P.D. 7995
(D.D.C. 1972).
19416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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implemented congressional policy, while refusing to allow proce-
dural barriers to defeat valid claims, by holding that although the
requirement that aggrieved persons file with the EEOC before suit
is jurisdictional, it is satisfied when the representative of the class
has raised with the EEOC an issue which he had standing to raise.70
The 7th Circuit explained:
The purpose of the section . . . is to provide for notice to the
charged party and to bring to bear the voluntary compliance
and conciliation features of the EEOC. Also, . . . another im-
portant function . . . is to permit the EEOC to determine
whether the charge is adequate. Finally, the charge determines
the scope of the alleged violation and thereby serves to narrow
the issues for prompt adjudication and decision. . . . Each of
these purposes is served when any charge is filed and a proper
suit follows .... 7, (Emphasis added.)
Bowe as well as other cases also point out that forcing each member
of a class to file with the EEOC would not only serve no purpose
but would also create even more of an administrative logjam.7 2
It is especially significant that the Labor Department position
apparently is that only one plaintiff need file charges with them
under the ADEA.7 3 The courts have based crucial statutory interpre-
"Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Oatis
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
5 E.P.D. 7241 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Accord, Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443
(5th Cir. 1972), where the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the EEOC, but not within ninety
days of written requests for jobs as "over-the-road" drivers instead of as "city drivers." The
district court held that the oral requests did not make the complaint to the EEOC timely,
but the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, saying:
We cannot agree with the district court that a discriminatory labor practice may
not be a continuing act. To so hold on the facts of this case would permit discrimi-
natory acts to go unrebuked, a construction far too restrictive and alien to the
liberal construction we have previously given the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
458 F.2d at 445.
"Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
721d. at 720; Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968).
The writer attended a hearing on Feb. 5, 1974 on a motion for reconsideration in the
case of Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 62 F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973). At that hearing,
Mr. Woodson of the Labor Department stated on the record, when asked what the Labor
Department's position was, "Our reaction is that your honor has ruled correctly in this area."
The order to which he referred provided that only the representative party in a class action
under the ADEA need file a charge with the Labor Department in order to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement, as well as that Rule 23 class actions are available under the
ADEA. Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co., 7 E.P.D. T 9104 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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tations in part on the opinion of the enforcing agency or related
department in the past;74 the Labor Department position should be
a significant factor in determining the proper construction of the
ADEA. 75
C. A Recommended Interpretation of the ADEA vis-z-vis Class
Actions
Statutory construction should effectuate congressional intent and
the policy of the statute without, of course, doing violence to the
language of the Act, which is ultimately controlling. Because of
their close relationship, 7 the ADEA is properly construed in the
light of Title VII cases despite its provision that it be enforced "in
accordance with" section 16(b) of the FLSA.7 That this phrase
incorporates section 16(b) in the ADEA should not lead to a simplis-
tic application of the case law under section 16(b) as part of the
FLSA to developing litigation under the ADEA.75
In two important aspects, the ADEA has been construed in the
light of civil rights cases as opposed to FLSA cases or to a strict
interpretation of the ADEA itself. On the question of whether every
plaintiff need file a complaint, several courts have turned to the
"
4See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). And the Supreme Court has
stated:
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great defer-
ence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with
its administration. . . . "Particularly is this respect due when the administrative
practice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men
charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the
parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.'"
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting Power Reactor v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396,
408 (1961).
750n a question of coverage of the ADEA, one court in deciding with the Secretary of
Labor noted, "The ruling by the Secretary of Labor is entitled to be given great weight by
the court in deciding the proper interpretation of the Act, especially where, as here, the case
is one of first impression." Hart v. United Steelworkers, 350 F. Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Pa.
1972), vacated on other grounds, 482 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1973).
"'See notes 42, 43, 44, 45, supra, and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit has expressly
recognized the kinship of the ADEA and Title VII. Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
729 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Supp. 1974).
7sThat a literal application is untenable is perhaps unwittingly demonstrated by the court
in Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 5 E.P.D. 1 7997 (S.D. Miss. 1972). There the court found both
individual notice to the Secretary of Labor and individual consents necessary under the
ADEA, in what appears to be a stricly literal reading-yet they without comment read
"employee" as "individual."
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civil rights cases and followed their rationale.7 Likewise, on the
question of exhaustion of state remedies, courts dealing with ADEA
cases have looked to civil rights litigation and espoused the ap-
proaches therein,8" in this area to a plaintiff's detriment. Section
633(b) 1 of the ADEA could be interpreted to require that a plaintiff
must file with the state first, or that only if a plaintiff does first file
with the state must he wait sixty days from commencement of that
action or until it is terminated. The latter interpretation, essentially
reading section 633(b) as providing alternative remedies at the
plaintiff's election, is clearly more favorable to plaintiffs. But the
two courts to reach this issue have held that filing with the state is
a jurisdictional prerequisite, and both have relied heavily on Title
VII cases.8"
Given that the ADEA is properly construed in the light of Title
VII cases and not FLSA cases, the proper approach to the ADEA in
the class action area is that adopted by the Fifth Circuit for Title
VII class actions in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.83 and approved
for the ADEA in Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co. 4 The Oatis
guidelines applied to the ADEA would provide: (1) the class must
meet the requirements of Rule 23; (2) the issues raised by the party
plaintiff or class representative are those he has standing to raise;
and (3) individuals whose grievances fall within the charges filed by
the party plaintiff or class representative need not file consents in
order to be members of the class.88 These rules incorporate necessary
procedural requirements while avoiding creation of unnecessary
rules that operate to bar appropriate relief; and they are easily
applied to section 16(b) by reading party plaintiff as class represent-
ative .
"'Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
nGoger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); McGarvey v. Merck & Co., 5
E.P.D. 8644 (D.N.J. 1973).
"129 U.S.C. § 633(b) (Supp. 1974).
'Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); McGarvey v. Merck & Co., 5
E.P.D. 8644 (D.N.J. 1973).
-398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
"62 F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
151d.
1'29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1971) reads: "No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
action unless he gives his consent in writing. . . ." The suggested construction is "No indi-
vidual shall be a class representative to any such action unless he gives his consent in
writing. .. ."
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In the final analysis perhaps the simplest argument is the most
persuasive. Since the language and history of the ADEA reveal no
clear congressional mandate to allow or disallow Rule 23 class ac-
tions, either interpretation has rational support. Yet for the courts,
in the absence of a clear congressional mandate, not to allow the
class action remedy under the ADEA would put them in the untena-
ble position of discriminating among forms of discrimination.
ANNE S. EMANUEL
